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This paper looks at how the cultivation of dissent towards the ruling Umayyad 
dynasty among the native Iranian population of Khorasan was immensely 
beneficial to accomplishing the goals of the Abbasid revolution. It is argued that 
the conquest of Khorasan by the revolutionaries was accomplished through a 
skillful clandestine propaganda campaign by the Abbasids, which culminated in 
simultaneous popular uprisings that overwhelmed Umayyad forces in the region 
and forced them to capitulate control of Khorasan. These popular uprisings then 
allowed the core of the revolutionary Abbasid forces to build a solid base and 
consolidate their power in Khorasan, without having to suffer any significant 
losses. The paper looks at how the Abbasid propaganda seized on the grievances 
of the local Iranian population living under Umayyad rule, and how it used these 
grievances as a means of conquering Khorasan without having to risk significant 
losses to their relatively outnumbered armed forces. The causes of the resentment 
of local Iranian populations of Khorasan towards the Umayyads are briefly 
addressed, as is the form of propaganda that the revolutionaries may have used to 
cultivate and organize popular uprisings, based on primary source accounts of 
speeches by leaders of the revolutions. Secondary sources are also used to shed 
light on how significant the underlying grievances of the Iranian population 
towards Umayyad rule may have been in facilitating support for the Abbasids’ 
quest to conquer Khorasan and ultimately overthrow the Umayyad dynasty. 
 
 
 
The Abbasid Revolution that began in 747 CE in the Khorasan province of the 
Umayyad dynasty would undeniably change the course of Islamic and Near Eastern 
history in a profound way, and as a result has been the subject of intense scholarly 
debate in the modern era. Much of the current debate focuses on the ethnic and 
linguistic character of the military force used by the Abbasids against their 
Umayyad enemies, and the civilian uprisings in the Umayyad province of Khorasan 
where the revolution began have arguably been neglected or overlooked as a less 
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significant factor in the ultimate success of the revolution. It can be argued that the 
relative ease with which the Abbasids were able to conquer the Khorasan province 
was largely due to the fact that they had the tacit support of the local population, 
who had risen up in revolt against the Umayyad garrisons in the major urban 
centres, and this in turn allowed the Abbasids to amalgamate their army and form 
a base from which to launch further offensive operations against the Umayyads. 
The conquest of Khorasan was achieved through a vigorous and persistent 
propaganda campaign by the Abbasids, which was principally aimed at addressing 
the socio-economic, socio-political and ethnically driven grievances of the Iranian 
population under Umayyad rule. By harvesting the resentment of the Iranian 
masses, and converting it into an organized armed revolt against a dispersed and 
numerically inferior Umayyad Arab army stationed in Khorasan, Abu Muslim and 
his Abbasid patrons were able to wrest control of Khorasan without incurring 
significant losses. This in turn allowed the movement to consolidate power and 
swell their ranks, before marching west to face the mainstay of Umayyad forces, in 
what would become the critically decisive battles of the Abbasid revolution. The 
subsequent success of the Abbasid revolution, and resulting destruction of the 
Umayyad dynasty, can therefore be explained in part by the resentment caused by 
discriminatory Umayyad policies towards the Iranian population of Khoarasan, and 
the neglect of government officials to address these grievances sufficiently. 
 
The principal complaint of the Iranian population living under Umayyad rule, 
which led to vehement opposition and the most serious grievances, was economic 
in origin.1 The imposition of the jizyah, or the poll tax, in addition to the Kharaj, or 
what is commonly understood as the land tax continued from the Sassanid system, 
had a crippling effect on the Iranian peasantry, who were already being taxed 
relatively heavily under the Sassanids.2 The dihqans, or Persian land owning 
aristocracy in charge of collecting taxes for the Umayyad governors of Khurasan, 
were undoubtedly guilty of pressuring the peasantry too much by demanding both 
the jizyah and the kharaj, most likely because they were paid for their services by 
taking a share of the taxes collected.3 Even though the dahaqin actively discouraged 
conversion,4 many Iranian peasants began to see conversion as a way to relieve 
themselves from the burden of heavy taxation.  
 
In the year 700, a great number of Iranian peasants converted to Islam, and travelled 
to Iraq to submit to Allah in front of the Umayyad governor al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-
Thaqafi, from whom they demanded to be exempt from paying the jizyah. 5 He sent 
them back to Khorasan without any such agreement, and did not even recognize 
                                                 
1Guzman, “The ‘Abbasid Revolution,” 235. 
2Guzman, 237. 
3Guzman, 233. 
4Guzman, 236. 
5Guzman, 231. 
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them as Muslim, mostly due to his understanding of the economic impact it would 
have on the Umayyad treasury. 6 The Umayyads had attempted to pacify Khorasan 
before by promising to remove the burden of jizyah from the Iranian mawali- the 
term used for non-Arab converts to Islam-, but had to rescind their order as a result 
of the severe strain put on the treasury as a result of the huge influx of converts to 
Islam.7 This decision proved disastrous in terms of stirring up dissent, and 
culminated in a series of serious revolts that broke out in Sughd from 728-729.8 
Ancient sources clearly list the complaints of the mawali about being charged the 
jizyah even after converting, to the last Umayyad governor of Khorasan, Nasr ibn 
Sayyar, who told the aggrieved mawali that he would collect their jizyah from non-
Muslims.9 Even though the grievances of the Iranian Khorasani peasants were 
originally almost exclusively economic, they would evolve into something much 
larger, which now involved socio-ethnic dimensions, and a general feeling of 
discrimination at the hands of the Umayyad governors of Khorasan. Having failed 
at being granted an exemption from the jizyah through conversion to Islam, the only 
way to become liberated from the burden of heavy taxes seemed to be violent 
revolt.10 The Abbasids used these grievances and anti-Umayyad sentiments to great 
effect in their persistent and clandestine propaganda campaign in Khorasan, by 
promising the Iranian population relief from heavy taxes, as well as something 
infinitely more valuable: inclusion into the government and equality under the 
banner of Islam. 
 
One indicator which may suggest that the grievances of the Iranian population were 
not entirely economical, was the enthusiastic willingness with which the dihaqin 
were to join and support the Abbasid revolt. The clandestine campaign of anti-
Umayyad propaganda aimed at harvesting dissent, is believed to have started 
around 718, and persisted up until 747 when Merv fell to the Abbasid 
revolutionaries.11 This means that by the time the Abbasids were ready to make 
their opposition to Umayyad rule public, the Iranian population, both peasantry and 
aristocracy, had been thoroughly indoctrinated against the Umayyads.12 Even 
though the Persian aristocracy and the bureaucratic elite were playing increasingly 
important roles within the Umayyad administration, they nevertheless still suffered 
the degradation and disabilities of their mawali status.13 This made them perfect 
targets for the Abbasid propaganda, which emphasized the equality of Muslims 
regardless of ethnicity and ancestry.14 The Abbasids could not have accomplished 
                                                 
6Guzman, 231. 
7Moshe, Revolt, 28. 
8Moshe, 28. 
9Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari, 1688. 
10Guzman, 235. 
11Guzman, 244. 
12Agha, “Abu Muslim’s Conquest,” 341. 
13Arjomand, “Abd Allah Ibn al-Muqaffa,” 12. 
14Kennedy, The Prophet, 126. 
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the conquest of Khorasan with such relative ease without the tacit consent, and 
enthusiastic enrollment of the Persian land owning aristocracy into the revolution, 
which was a direct result of a generation of propaganda aimed towards ethnic 
Iranian sentiments. 
 
The underground and clandestine nature of the revolutionary movement from its 
outset up until the time it was made public, means that records of the Abbasid 
propaganda, and their call to da’wah, or the mission, are not readily available. Clear 
insights into what their propaganda would have looked like during the generation 
or so spent fomenting resentment and dissent towards the Umayyad rule within the 
local Iranian population of Khorasan, can be gained by looking at speeches and 
attitudes of the revolution’s leaders after their position was made public. Qahtaba 
ibn Shabib gives a glimpse into how the Iranian resentment of being conquered and 
ruled over by foreign Syrian Arabs was harvested, in a speech that he gives to rouse 
the men of Khorasan, before they are to engage the largest Umayyad Syrian force 
they had encountered to date.15 He references how the land of Khorasan had 
belonged to their forefathers, and how it had been conquered by the race of the 
prophet, clearly referencing the Arabs, and how their land and women were taken 
while their children were enslaved.16 He goes on to say that the Umayyad 
governance has become oppressive and caused the local population to fear them as 
a result, and that the men of Khorasan now have the opportunity to exact vengeance 
and punishment upon their unjust oppressors, and in turn reclaim the lands of 
Khorasan which belonged to their forefathers.17  
 
Abu Muslim, the charismatic quasi-legendary leader of the Abbasids in Khorasan 
who is credited with organizing the Iranian masses in Khorasan against their 
Umayyad rulers, also exhibits a main principle of Abbasid propaganda, which 
claims that the Khorasanis are justified in their attempt to rid themselves of 
Umayyad rule by any means necessary, as a result of the oppression they have 
suffered. When the delegation of Nasr bin Sayyar makes accusations of atrocities 
committed by the Iranian population through their massacre of the Umayyad forces 
in Nasa, Talaqan, Marw al Rudh, Amul and Zamm, Abu Muslim responds by 
saying that while he did not instruct these acts, he cannot blame the perpetrators as 
they were a community that was targeted for oppression and bloodshed.18 Through 
the study of these passages, among many others, it becomes easier to form a picture 
of what the Abbasid propaganda aimed at the Iranian population may have looked 
like, and how this propaganda was instrumental in cultivating a powerful organized 
revolt that would spell the end of Umayyad rule in Khorasan and beyond. 
 
                                                 
15Al-Tabari, 2005. 
16Al-Tabari, 2005. 
17Al-Tabari, 2006. 
18Agha, 344. 
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Merely harvesting resentment and using it to incite random acts of revolt, would 
not have been nearly enough to dislodge a powerful, well disciplined, experienced 
and organized Umayyad army and government in Khorasan. Orchestrating the 
dissent into an organized armed uprising and timing the revolts perfectly would be 
instrumental to the success of the Abbasids, a task that was carried out 
immaculately by Abu Muslim. The conquest of Khorasan was not achieved by 
marching armies, but rather through the careful orchestration of local eruptions, 
which in turn allowed the Abbasids to keep their armed forces fully intact before 
facing off in pitched battles with the Umayyads down the road.19 This was achieved 
through Abu Muslim’s organizational ability to engulf the entire region in one 
simultaneous blaze, by having the Iranian masses use their numerical superiority to 
crush dispersed Arab contingents at one time all over the districts of Khorasan.20 
The simultaneous occurrence of revolts in so many districts at the same time, would 
not allow the Umayyads to gather their dispersed forces and therefore be able to 
put down any of the insurrections effectively,  which in turn allowed Abu Muslim 
and the Abbasid army to capture Merv, the capital of Khorasan and seat of the 
Umayyad governor, without any bloodshed.21 Khorasan was therefore conquered 
without any major pitched battles, which in turn allowed the Abbasids to 
consolidate their power and recruit many new fighters into their relatively thin 
ranks, allowing the Abbasids to be able to effectively challenge a numerically 
superior Umayyad army further down the road. 
 
The seeds of resentment to the Umayyad rule in Khorasan were planted by the 
Umayyads themselves, in the form of their ethnically discriminatory practices 
towards the local Iranian population. Skillful Abbasid propaganda over the course 
of a generation, aimed at fostering the sentiments of the disgruntled Iranians, 
watered and cultivated these seeds into a powerful atmosphere of opposition to 
Umayyad rule. This opposition was then carefully organized, and when the time 
was right, deliberately ignited into a simultaneous revolutionary eruption 
throughout Khorasan that overwhelmed the Umayyad troops stationed in the 
province, thereby allowing the Abbasids to conquer Khorasan with minimal losses 
to their main fighting force. The relative ease with which the Abbasids managed to 
conquer Khorasan was due in no small part to the tacit support of the local Iranian 
population as a result of their opposition to Umayyad rule and their aspirations of 
social equality, and it was this base of local partisans allowed them to consolidate 
their gains and solidify the foundation of their revolution. It can therefore be argued 
that the discrimination suffered by the Iranian population of Khorasan, at the hands 
of their Umayyad rulers, can be directly cited as one of the most significant factors 
in the success of the Abbasid revolution and consequent destruction of the 
Umayyad dynasty. 
                                                 
19Agha, 344. 
20Agha, 345. 
21Agha, 345. 
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